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Meaning and Necessity: Can Semantics Stop Same-Sex Marriage?1
Think of this paper as an exercise in applied philosophy of language. It has both semantic and deontic
concerns. More than about the meaning of ‘marriage,’ it is about how one goes about determining the
meaning of social kind terms like ‘marriage’. But it is equally about the place of philosophy of language
in the legislative sphere, and inter alia, about the roles and responsibilities of philosophers in public life.
I. “Why Do They Want Our Word?”
Gays and lesbians are now marriageable in The Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, Canada and very
tentatively in Massachusetts. This paper revisits an argument central to the case as it was argued in
Canadian tribunals, an argument that dominated discussions in the Canadian Parliament, and that
continues to dominate discussion as I write.
The case is especially fascinating for philosophers of language (and for the reputation of our
discipline should anyone still hold philosophy of language to be a useless exercise in formalism).
The arguments that caused and are still causing the most trouble revolve around the word: Why
must same-sex unions be called “marriages”? And is it even possible for the meaning of ‘marriage’
to countenance gays and lesbians? In the Canadian trials, the Courts sought help with exactly these
questions from philosophers of language.
Sociolinguist Sue Ehrlich argued in favour of the petitioners that excluding gays and lesbians from
such a basic social institution as marriage contributes to their marginalization, and that calling gay
marriages anything other than “marriages” –for instance, calling them “registered domestic
partnerships” smacks of the discredited “separate but equal” doctrine, a doctrine all the more
harmful, she argues, as it is embedded in a context of existing homophobia. Philosopher Rob
Stainton argued against same-sex marriage, rejecting Ehrlich’s claims as “inadequately supported”
by cognitive science.2
Stainton claims that because of the meaning of the word “marriage” in contemporary Canadian
English, it is logically impossible for gays to be married –“it is a necessary truth that gays cannot
marry” [Stainton para 9]. Furthermore, he claims that institutions (like Courts) have no business
changing the current meanings of ordinary words. I was called upon by the petitioners to evaluate
Stainton’s claims, a responsibility I undertook with great conviction.3
The case is philosophically interesting also because it is fully generalizable: formally identical cases
exist in the 1928 Canadian “persons” case, where the issue was whether or not women were persons
and hence could occupy seats in the Senate,4 or in the 1866 Civil Rights Act in the US which
declared blacks to be citizens, or in Loving v. Virginia 1967, where the issue was whether a mixed-
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race marriage really counted as a marriage.5 All deployed Stainton’s semantic argument: all had in
common the attempt by the State, sustained allegedly by ordinary intuition, to exclude by
“definitional preclusion.”6 But while the latter have lost their intuitive availability (it being hard
now to put oneself in the head of someone arguing that a woman is not a person, nor miscegenation
a marriage), the same-sex case is alive and for this reason makes an ideal test case for certain claims
in philosophy of language. In particular, it is useful in pointing to a fundamental fallacy in
appealing to alleged analytical intuitions in substantive matters.
Furthermore, I hope this paper will reveal the extent –I think unrecognized– to which our
philosophical views about language overlap with our moral perspectives. As a bonus, it may also
clarify a thing or two about the role of Courts in our mental life.
II. The Meaning of ‘Marriage’?
The first part of Stainton’s argument to the Courts purports to establish the meaning of ‘marriage’
in contemporary English. I present it in full:
(1) ’Marriage’ is a word reflecting a well-understood social concept in our common
language. [Stainton, para 60]
(2) As a matter of empirical fact:
’Marriage’ currently applies only to male/female pairs. [Stainton, para 16]
(3.i) The institution of marriage cannot be conceptualized independently of its history:
In my opinion, an understanding of the term ‘marriage’ necessarily entails [its] long and
rich history. [Stainton, para 19]
We cannot divorce our understanding of the term from its history. When I say that
marriage “is” a descendent of its history, this is essential to understanding precisely what
the word 'marriage' actually means. [Stainton, para 20]
(3.ii) The history of the institution of marriage is derived from religion:
“To look at marriage as divorced from the religious interpretation of the practice and the
historical background of the practice is, in my opinion, to miss the meaning of marriage
altogether. Marriage just is a descendent of a highly particular, highly stylized practice
with religious roots.” [Stainton, para. 20]
I postpone to section VII(i) below a discussion of Stainton’s sub-argument in support of premises
(3.i) and (3.ii).
(4) Applying ‘marriage’ to gays and lesbians creates a semantic anomaly:
English does not allow us to say ‘I now declare you husband and husband’ any more
than it allows us to say ‘My boys are very close sisters.’ These sentences violate
semantic rules. [Stainton, para. 14]
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I postpone to section VII(ii) below a discussion of Stainton’s sub-argument in support of premise
(4).
(5) Extending the reference of ‘marriage’ to gay and lesbian unions would change the
meaning of ‘marriage’:
In my opinion, defining ‘marriage’ as being possible between two men, or between two
women, really would amount to a difference of sense, not just a precisification.
[Stainton, para 61]
(6) Applying our (ordinary common) word ‘marriage’ to homosexual relationships is
incorrect, indeed unintelligible:
The common parlance term ‘marriage’ can only be sensibly applied to male/female pairs.
[Stainton, para 14]
I believe that a correct understanding of the semantic content of the term ‘marriage’ does
not permit us to ask “whether or not same-sex couples should be allowed to be married”.
The correct semantic analysis suggests that we cannot sensibly ask whether men should
be able to marry one another, any more than we can ask why two boys cannot be sisters,
or why a bachelor cannot be married. The current semantics of our common language
simply rule out these options. It is not a question of some official body permitting boys
to be sisters, or not permitting bachelors to be married. Sisters are women, and
bachelors are unmarried, as matter of present meaning. In the same way, I will suggest,
matrimony just is the union of a man and a woman. [Stainton, para 10 –all emphasis
here and elsewhere original]
All of which goes to support the following contention:
(7) That ‘marriage’ applies only to male-female unions is due to the very meaning of the
word:
It is part of the present meaning of the word ‘marriage’ in our common tongue that it
applies only to male-female conjugal unions. [Stainton, para 10]
Hence,
(8) It is a matter of logic that homosexuals cannot marry; it is a semantic theorem:
Given the present meaning, it is a necessary truth that same-sex couples cannot marry.
[Stainton, para 9]
This is how Stainton derives the analyticity of “a marriage is the union of a man and a woman
only.”
In the second part of his argument, Stainton aims to dismiss suggestions that, were that indeed the
current meaning of ‘marriage’, then we should simply change it in the interest of equal rights for
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gays and lesbians. (As I do not believe that what Stainton claims to be the meaning of ‘marriage’ is,
or even could be in a secular democracy, I do not believe that a change to its meaning is necessary
to include gays and lesbians. See below.) Here is Stainton’s argument against changing the meaning
of ‘marriage’ to include same-sex unions:
(9) The Courts have no mandate to change the meanings of words for legal purposes:
The word ‘marriage’ is not a term of art in jurisprudence. Unlike the word ‘tort’, for
example, it is not an item created by and for the legal system.7 Nevertheless, it has
important legal consequences: like many other words, it leads a double life. But this does
not make it a purely legal term. Rather, it is a word reflecting a well-understood social
concept in our common language, with a meaning that implicates a specific historically
conditional status, understood by many as tied to religious practices. [Stainton, para 60]
Because ‘marriage’ is not merely an item of legal jargon, but is rather a term of ordinary
parlance albeit with legal implications, I believe that a change to its meaning in English
cannot simply be decreed. [Stainton, para 61]
(10) Court appointed changes in the meanings of words will inevitably cause
unacceptable levels of confusion:
Where the legal sense of a term is markedly different from its common use, common
users of the language will make mistakes. Needless to say, the consequences of such
mistakes will vary. I can only opine as an expert that such mistakes will be inevitable
because the stipulated change will not be reflected in the common tongue. [Stainton,
para 59]
One can at best create an unacceptable cleavage between ordinary usage and the legal
meaning. [Stainton, para 64]
(11) Changes in the meanings of words can only come from the grassroots:
From a linguistic point of view, wholly altering the definition of a term by decree is not
possible. Such redefinition is in conflict with the normal use and development of
language. [Stainton, para 64]
And in case that is not enough:
(12) Changing the meaning of ‘marriage’ to include gay and lesbian unions would be
such a profound change that it would render the word ‘marriage’ as meaningless as an
oxymoron:
To change the meaning (or nature) of ‘marriage’ such that we can sensibly use the term
to also refer to same-sex unions would be a change equivalent to changing the meaning
of the term ‘bachelor’ to also include married men. [Stainton, para. 11]
In my opinion, defining ‘marriage’ as being possible between two men, or between two
women, would be like redefining ‘sisters’ to include pairs of boys. [Stainton, para 61]
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[Implicit conclusion apparently not noticed by Stainton: neither Parliament nor Congress can pass
laws lifting the ban against gay marriage. How could the government succeed where God Himself
couldn’t?!] With the result that:
(13) The exclusion of gays and lesbians from the current institution of marriage is
necessarily irremediable:
The marriage ceremony is the method for becoming life partners which has a faith-based
history, and must involve a man and a woman. [Stainton, para. 14]
This is how Stainton defends the unrevisability of the (allegedly) analytic definition of ‘marriage.’
The argument deserves attention not only because it is widespread — why, even accomplished
philosophers are defending it — but because its structure bears a revealing similarity to a famously
plausible argument articulated by Putnam. Insight comes out of comparing them.
III. The Meaning of ‘Meaning’
In 1972, Hilary Putnam presented a famous argument about natural kind terms now widely accepted
among philosophers (and, with proviso, among linguists). I reconstruct its main premises in a
nutshell, with some extra flourishes of relevance to what follows.
(Putnam 1) Sociolinguistic observation:
Since well before we discovered which chemical elements are constitutive of water, the
word “water” has, as a matter of fact, always been applied (consistently and exclusively)
to this (pointing to the currently existing stuff in rivers and lakes).
(Putnam 2) Previous use imposes normative ontological commitments:
Consequently, whether some stuff is rightly called “water” or not (proviso: when used as
a chemical term) depends on whether or not it bears the same-(kind of)-liquid-as relation
to this (the original stuff). This, the stuff in rivers and lakes, is a natural kind. Its essence
is individuated by its chemical elements.
(Putnam 3) Facts, as interpreted by experts, determine the extensions of our concepts:
Chemists discover that water is constituted by chemical elements H2O. So H2O-ness
individuates the same-as relation for (the natural kind) water.
(Putnam 4) Metaphysical fact (trivial):
Nothing but H2O is H2O.
(Putnam 5) Metaphysical consequence (non-trivial):
Therefore water just is H2O: a necessary condition for a liquid to bear the same-liquid-
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as relation to water is for that liquid to be H2O.
The odourless, colourless, tasteless, potable thirst-quenching liquid XYZ on Twin-Earth
that is indistinguishable to us from water may be very water-like (and perhaps for
ordinary intents and purposes, water-like is just as good as water). But it isn’t WATER.
Seeming-to-us-as-if-it-were-water is not the same thing as being water. Fool's gold is
not gold.
(Putnam 6) Modal consequence:
If x=y then (by necessitation) (x=y):
So water is of necessity H2O.
Thus does Putnam derive the necessary a posteriori: Water is H2O. And that’s why meanings ain’t
in the head: ‘water’ (at least in its use as a natural kind term) means this substance, and this
substance, know it or not, is H2O. Of note here is the a posteriority of the claim, and the
immutability of the (chemical) substance which is water.
We can extend Putnam’s argument without prejudice to his views as follows:
(Putnam 7) Normative linguistic consequence:
Our word 'water', when used with its ordinary chemical meaning, excludes reference to
XYZ. It is correctly applied (indeed, intelligible) only if it is used to refer to instances of
H2O.
(Putnam 8) Normative judicial consequence:
Given our actual understanding of the relation same-liquid-as, if inventors of XYZ
petitioned the Court to have the word “water” apply to their product, the Justices on the
Bench would be reduced to head scratching: to request that XYZ be declared water is as
nonsensical as miners applying to the Courts to have fool’s gold declared gold.
Like most, I find this argument largely convincing.8
It is easy –though some have thought it overly charitable—to recast Stainton’s argument along
Putnamian lines.
(S 1) Sociolinguistic observation:
The word “marriage” has always been applied (consistently and exclusively) to these
(pointing to heterosexual married couples) relationships. (cf. (2), and (S 3A) below)
(S 2) Previous use imposes normative ontological commitments:
Whether some relationship is rightly called “marriage” or not depends on whether or not
it bears the same-(kind of)-relationship-as relation to these, the original relationships.
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This kind of relationship is a historical kind. Its essence is individuated by its origins.
(cf. (3.i))
(S 3) Facts, as interpreted by experts, determine the extensions of our concepts:
(A) Religion
What individuates the same-as relation for (the historical kind) marriage is its religious
past. (cf. (3.ii)) Religion tells us that the individuation condition for marriage is
constitution by a man and a woman. [Here, Stainton presupposes implicitly –and
apparently falsely-- that marriage has throughout history been exclusive to
heterosexuals.]
(B) “Our common language”
The word for this kind of relationship is a word of our common language. Hence it is
we, as users of “our common language,” who individuate the essence of marriage (hence
analytical truths derivable from it).
(C) Dictionaries
According to the Canadian Oxford Dictionary, “which dictionary is commonly accepted
as reflecting common usage in Canada, as of 1998” [Stainton, para 12], the essential
properties of marriage in the minds of Canadians are:
the legal or religious union of a man and a woman
in order to live together and often to have children.
As this dictionary definition makes clear, the common parlance term ‘marriage’ (in the
requisite sense in which it is synonymous with ‘wedlock’ and ‘matrimony’ [as opposed
to the figurative sense of “a marriage of minds”]) can only be sensibly applied to
male/female pairs. [Stainton, para. 14]
Stainton does not appear to notice that individuative conditions stemming from the history of
marriage, those stemming from “our” common language understanding of the term, and those
stemming from dictionaries, might all pull in opposite directions: while sofas began their history as
padded chairs on the backs of camels, most English dictionaries define them as carpeted raised
floors or beds, yet none of those constitute “our” understanding of the term today; and while
marriage began its history as bargaining females for chattel, the dictionary (conservative reflection
of a previous age) defines it as a union in order to live together, yet neither of those are what
constitute “our” understanding of the word today. Such examples are legion.
(S 4) Metaphysical fact (trivial):
A union of two men or of two women is not a union of a man and a woman.
(S 5) Metaphysical consequence (non-trivial):
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Marriage just is the union of a man and a woman: a necessary condition for a
relationship to bear the same-relationship-as relation to marriage is for that relationship
to be heterosexual. (cf. (6))
“Sisters are women, and bachelors are unmarried, as a matter of present meaning. In the
same way, matrimony just is the union of a man and a woman.” [Stainton, para 10]
The intimate, sexual, loving, committed, long-term, even child-raising homosexual
relationship that is indistinguishable to us from marriage may be very marriage-like (and
perhaps for ordinary intents and benefits, marriage-like is just as good as marriage). But
it isn’t MARRIAGE. Seeming-to-us-as-if-it-were-marriage is not the same thing as being
marriage.
A plastic tree is not a tree, a same-sex marriage is not a marriage. [Stainton, para.15]
I postpone, to section VII.ii below, a discussion of Stainton’s sub-argument in support of this
claim.
(S 6) Modal consequence:
Marriage is of necessity a union of a man and a woman. 
It is a matter of logic that gays cannot marry (a semantic theorem):
Given the present meaning, it is a necessary truth that same-sex couples cannot marry.
[Stainton, para 9]
(S 7) Normative linguistic consequences:
(A) exclusion
Our word “marriage”, when used with its ordinary common meaning, excludes reference
to homosexual relationships.
“It is part of the present meaning of the word ‘marriage’ in our common tongue that it
applies only to male-female conjugal unions.” [Stainton, para 10]
(B) senselessness
‘Marriage’ is intelligible only if it is used to refer to heterosexual relationships.
“The common parlance term ‘marriage’ can only be sensibly applied to male/female
pairs.” [Stainton, para 14]
(C) imposed semantic shift




“In my opinion, defining ‘marriage’ as being possible between two men, or between two
women, really would amount to a difference of sense, not just a precisification.”
[Stainton, para 61]
(S 8) Normative judicial consequence:
Given our actual understanding of the relation same-relationship-as, if a same-sex couple
petitioned the Court to have the word ‘marriage’ apply to their union, the Justices on the
Bench would be reduced to head scratching: for two men to petition the Court for the
right to marry is as unintelligible as for two brothers to petition the Courts for the right
to be called sisters.
“I believe that a correct understanding of the semantic content of the term
‘marriage’ does not permit us to ask “whether or not same-sex couples should
be allowed to be married”. The correct semantic analysis suggests that we
cannot sensibly ask whether men should be able to marry one another, any
more than we can ask why two boys cannot be sisters, or why a bachelor
cannot be married. The current semantics of our common language simply
rule out these options. It is not a question of some official body permitting
boys to be sisters, or not permitting bachelors to be married. Sisters are
women, and bachelors are unmarried, as matter of present meaning. In the
same way, I will suggest, matrimony just is the union of a man and a
woman.” [Stainton, para 10]
Stainton argues that what the judges must decide is not at bottom a question of lifting legal barriers,
but rather a question of imposing a language change from above to accommodate certain people:
”the question before the court is not whether gay men and lesbians should be allowed to
marry, but rather whether there is some reason why we should change the meaning (or
nature) of ‘marriage’ such that we can sensibly use the term to also refer to same-sex
unions.” [Stainton, para 11]
Not only does Stainton perceive no reason for the Courts to allow ‘marriage’ to apply to same-sex
unions, as doing so wouldn’t eradicate homophobia [Stainton, para. 20; here, cf. fn 2]; he thinks
both that the Courts wouldn’t succeed if they tried, language change being a grass roots affair, and
that it is not within the jurisdiction of the Courts even to attempt it. The Courts can no more rule
that the institution of marriage extends to same-sex couples than they can rule that fool’s gold is
gold, presumably for roughly the same reasons.
Let us examine Stainton’s argument in light of Putnam’s.
IV. Nonsense and preference
In 1892, Gottlob Frege taught us that the senses of words determine their referents; senses, though
abstract, are objective, public and shareable, and to speak the same language is to attach the same
senses to the same words. Frege does not much discuss how it actually happens that individuals
attach the same senses to their words so as to speak the same language. The question is taken up in
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“The Thought” (1918), where Frege adopts a decidedly subjectivist position (with respect to proper
names):
If both Leo Peter and Rudolph Lingens mean by ‘Dr Gustav Lauben’ the doctor who is
the only doctor living in a house known to both of them, then they both understand the
sentence ‘Dr Gustav Lauben has been wounded’ in the same way; they associate the
same thought with it. […] Suppose further that Herbert Garner knows that Dr Gustav
Lauben was born on 13 September, 1875 in N.N. and this is not true of anyone else;
suppose, however, that he does not know where Dr Lauben now lives nor indeed
anything else about him. On the other hand, suppose Leo Peter does not know that Dr
Lauben was born on 13 September 1875, in N.N. Then as far as the proper name ‘Dr
Gustav Lauben’ is concerned, Herbert Garner and Leo Peter do not speak the same
language. […] With a proper name, it is a matter of the way that the object so designated
is presented [to one’s consciousness]. This may happen in different ways, and to every
such way there corresponds a special sense of a sentence containing the proper name.”9
Frege is quick to treat proper names as the exception, however. Perhaps that is because he assumed,
like most except Chomskians do, that words other than proper names, in the venerable words of
David Kaplan, “come to us pre-packaged with their semantic value,” that to understand such words
at all is to grasp their socially customary sense.
But just as the latter half of twentieth century philosophy destroyed Frege’s descriptivist account of
the senses of proper names, it also attacked the prevailing understanding of socially customary
senses. Putnam showed that if the socially customary sense of ‘water,’ for example, were to be
understood to be, say, the transparent, potable, odourless, colourless liquid flowing in rivers and
lakes, then senses don’t determine reference, since this sense of ‘water’ determines H2O as the
reference of ‘water’ on Earth, but XYZ as the reference of ‘water’ on Twin-Earth. To save the
reference-determining property of senses, and if the senses of our words are not what determine
what they designate, what could be?, Putnam concludes, with Frege, that senses aren’t in the head,
but rather in expert extrapolations from factual instances of use.
Thus modern chemistry gives us a better understanding of water. Locke, like me, could not have
recognized H2O from XYZ, though, given the facts, he would have admitted that they were
substances with distinct real essences. Locke, aiming at the transparent, potable, odourless,
colourless liquid actually flowing in our rivers and lakes, would have taken himself to be using the
same word “water” as we do, and to be intending by it the same concept of water as we do, but he
did not understand the sense of the word in the language, or the nature of the concept, half as well
as some of us now do.
Where should we look for a convincing understanding of the customary sense of ‘marriage’?
Stainton claims that ‘marriage’ is a word reflecting a well-understood social concept in our common
language (cf. (1)). Now, this is either question-begging or demonstrably false. The vividness of the
controversy surrounding the issue of same-sex marriage proves positively that, if there can be said
to be “a social concept of marriage in our common tongue,” it is not well understood by users of




Just to set it aside, the empirical claim that the English word “marriage” refers only to heterosexual
couples (cf. (2) & (7)) is also likely false. Some anthropologists, who report their findings in
ordinary English, assure us that in some historical, cultural and religiously conservative contexts,
women have married women, and men have married men. Stainton is committed to the view that
the translations involved in these anthropological reports are at best metaphorical, at worse mistaken
(more on this below).
Except for a brief discussion of premise (2), I will assume, for the sake of the argument and in spite
of the evidence, that homosexuals have never anywhere been married, and see what, if anything,
should follow from this. (Nothing at all, I shall argue, as long as we countenance homosexuals as
full and equal members of our civil community.) There are three points in the argument that I will
focus on: these are premises (4), (5) and (6), since they largely sustain the conclusion in (7).10 The
relevant question here is: How do we know what ‘marriage’ really means?
Stainton claims that the very meaning of the word prevents it from applying to same-sex couples,
so he had better be right about the meaning of the word. (I think he’s wrong about the meaning of
this word, as about meanings generally.) He cites the Oxford Canadian Dictionary (cf. (3S.C)) as
an authority about our usage, so it is we here, the common speakers of the common language, who
are being taken as the experts on the individuation conditions for marriage. I will come back to this
later.
As linguists have long known, dictionaries are not reliable as repositories of usage, for it is in the
very nature of dictionaries to lag well behind the living languages they purport to describe. It is a
platitude that no matter how descriptively accurate they aim to be about current usage, because they
take decades, often several decades, to compile, dictionaries are systematically behind by the time
they are published.
Moreover, it is false that dictionaries typically aim to describe common acceptance. (The notorious
controversy surrounding Webster's Third International Dictionary (1961) under the direction of
Philip Gove, which proposed to do just that, proves the point.11 ) For instance, most English
speakers use the expression “to beg the question” in the sense of “to force upon one the question...”
but no dictionary that I know yet acknowledges this ubiquitous usage.
Dictionaries are not scientific documents, as is evident from their methodology. As a case in point,
the Oxford Canadian was largely compiled by answers its editor received from whichever member
of the public bothered to respond to postcards that were sent around willy-nilly requesting examples
of uniquely Canadian uses of words.
In particular, the definition of ‘marriage’ cited by Stainton is an egregiously bad one if read as
providing necessary and sufficient conditions for marriage. It is both overinclusive – merely
religious unions are not legal marriages under Canadian (or US) Law – and underinclusive –
married couples needn’t ever live together in Canada or in the US and would remain just as married
if all and only unmarried couples had children henceforth. Moreover, the union “of a man and a
woman” would appear to preclude Hmong marriages among children well before they reach
puberty: though such unions would not be legally sanctioned if they took place in North America, it
cannot be doubted that North Americans use the word “marriage” with a meaning that encompasses
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even such unions. It is precisely because we do so that such unions caused an uproar in the ‘90s in
a Californian community home to Hmongs where such marriages were practiced. Moreover, that
some same-sex couples are now legally married in the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, Canada and,
for the time being, in Massachusetts, is something that all dictionary entries for ‘marriage’
henceforth will have to acknowledge on pain of being factually wrong. So the dictionary entry cited
by Stainton is inadequate even according to common usage. Without supplementation by ‘typically’
–which would reveal its status as a stereotype rather than a definition– it is inaccurate. But the
inclusion of ‘typically’ would undermine the essential heterosexuality of the definition.
Dictionary entries are not definitions. The Merriam-Webster Dictionary (1989) entry under
‘kangaroo’ reads:
“any of several large leaping marsupial mammals of Australia with powerful hind legs
and a long thick tail”.
Obviously, as a definition, this is astoundingly false: no kangaroo would be any less a kangaroo
were we to discover that kangaroos actually originated in India, nor is it essential to any kangaroo's
being such that it have any legs, much less powerful ones, any tail, much less a long and thick one,
or that it be able to leap. If kangaroos universally evolved weak hind legs, straggly tails, and an
inability to leap, they would perhaps be sickly kangaroos, but no less kangaroos for all that. At their
best, dictionaries accurately represent stereotypes. And as Putnam spent a good part of his life
demonstrating, but evidently still bears repeating: stereotypes are not meanings.
V. Bob and Ted and Carol and Alice: Beyond Rigidity
According to Stainton, the current dictionary entry for ‘marriage’ states a necessary truth. Hence it
cannot be altered. All the Court could do –though according to him it can’t even do that– is to
create a brand new word ‘marriage’ with a new meaning (a homonym of the original, if you will,
call it “marriage2”), thus creating a concomitant change in the very nature of marriage. (Recall
Stainton’s summary of the issue: “whether there is some reason why we should change the
meaning (or nature) of ‘marriage’ such that we can sensibly use the term to also refer to same-sex
unions”.)
So what happened in 2001 in the Netherlands, according to Stainton, is this: Per impossibile, the
Dutch government replaced the old word “huwelijk”, the word correctly translated in English as
‘marriage’, with a new word “huwelijk2”, a word for which English has yet no translation.* But
since ‘huwelijk2’ has replaced ‘huwelijk1’, ‘huwelijk1’ is no longer in use as of April 2001.
Before April 2001: ‘marriage’ in English equals ‘huwelijk’ in Dutch
As of April 1st 2001: ‘huwelijk2’ in Dutch does not equal ‘marriage’ in English
...And in so doing, the Dutch government has destroyed, in the Netherlands, the institution we
know of as marriage.** As of April 2001, even those previously “huwelijk1” (as the Dutch used to
say) become “huwelijked2” (as the Dutch now say). There is nothing else for them to be but
huwelijked2, since huwelijk1 no longer exists as a recognized institution.*** It is precisely
Stainton’s point that being huwelijk1 is not the same property as being huwelijk2. For according to
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Stainton: Marriage-among-hetero-OR-homosexuals is not the same institution as Marriage-among-
heterosexuals-ONLY. So as of the aptly named April Fool’s Day 2001 when Dutch law recognized
same-sex marriage, marriage ceased to exist as a Dutch institution, every married Dutch couple
ceased to be married as such (just as surely as Yugoslavs ceased to exist as such with the collapse
of Yugoslavia).****
If Stainton's view is correct, then we must rewrite all Dutch-English dictionaries and retrain all
Dutch-English bilinguals, for the word ‘huwelijked2’ according to Stainton does not mean what the
English word ‘marriage’ means – let’s translate it as ‘shmarriage’. Moreover, if Stainton is right,
Canadians at the moment can no longer speak about huwelijked2 Dutch couples, gay or straight, for
English does not have a word for that concept: that is not what our word ‘married’ can mean
according to him, and we don't have another word waiting in the wings to express the concept of
shmarriage – though we could soon be saddled with “registered domestic partnerships” (but I am
far from convinced the Dutch should accept that as a translation for ‘huwelijk2’). What is worse,
Belgians no longer speak French, and Canadians no longer the same language as USAnians. The
homophobic fanatics were right: all hell has broken loose.
Before dismissing this as just so much semantic shmaltz, consider that Stainton’s argument here is
exactly what underlies the argument oft repeated in right-wing rantings since June 10, 2003 in
Canada, that gays have destroyed marriage. If Stainton is right, they have: extending the reference
of ‘marriage’ to homosexuals, according to him, has caused an essential change in the Canadian
institution of marriage (we used to have marriage, now what we have is shmarriage) – to say
nothing of the fact that, according to Stainton, it has not only changed the meaning but has turned a
meaningful term into an oxymoron (“shmarriage, SHshmarriage,” as we might say...).
Stainton is aware that there are prima facie counterexamples to his claim (cf. (6)) that a gay
marriage is as unintelligible as a married bachelor or a boy sister. People do use, apparently
meaningfully, the expression “gay marriage”. Indeed, the following sentences seem fully intelligible
in English:
Some married couples in the Netherlands are gay.
The Massachusetts Court ruled that the ban on same-sex marriage was unconstitutional. 
Canada has just passed same-sex marriage legislation.
If they are, that alone entails that the definition of a marriage as a union only between members of
the opposite sex is problematic.
Here is Stainton’s reply to these counterexamples:
One might suppose that when one sensibly uses “same-sex marriage” to apply to certain
unions, it follows that the union referred to is both same-sex and a marriage. Thus, it
might be argued that the term marriage is sensibly applied to a same-sex union. In which
case, there are couplings which do not involve male/female pairs, but which are
marriages; and the dictionary is just wrong. The problem with this line of argument is
that it is simply not true that whenever a word-compound applies to a thing, it is
because both words in the compound apply to that thing. Indeed, as formal semantics has
long recognized, compounds like ‘green car’ are something of an exception. For
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instance, ‘plastic tree’ applies to things which are not actually trees at all. Rather, a
“plastic tree” is something which is similar to a tree, but is actually plastic. In the same
way, we may speak of “gay marriage” because we recognize that such unions have some
sort of relation to a marriage: they are like a marriage, but they are not a marriage
because they involve same-sex unions. Thus, even if ‘same-sex marriage’ is a compound
consisting of ‘same-sex’ and the word ‘marriage’, this still would not show that the
meaning of the word allows for marriages that are of same-sex couples. [Stainton, para
15]
Stainton is suggesting in this passage
(i) that ‘gay’ and ‘same-sex’ are non-restricting adjectives, an example of which is
‘fake’.
Non-restricting adjectives have the following entailment pattern:
a fake diamond is not a diamond
fool's gold is not gold
a plastic tree is not a tree
By contrast, a restricting adjective respects the following entailment pattern:
a tall surgeon is a surgeon
a nasty lawyer is a lawyer
an Albanian philosopher is a philosopher.
Stainton further claims
(ii) that restricting adjectives (as in “green car”) are the exception. (!!)
He then suggests to the Court
(iii) that ‘same-sex marriages’ and ‘gay marriages’ are not intended in common parlance
to mean real marriages,
witness the fact that the adjectives ‘same-sex’ and ‘gay’ might be understood by their users as non-
restricting adjectives, in which case a same-sex marriage would no more be a marriage than a fake
gun is a gun. (A better reason might simply be because gay marriages are not, yet, legally
recognized marriages. But let that pass.)
Now, imagine running this with other qualifiers of marriage, say ‘interracial’ and ‘second’, where
the mere possibility that these might be understood as nonrestrictive adjectives would be held as a
reason to doubt that an interracial marriage or a second marriage really are marriages. There was a
time when some people did treat ‘interracial’ as a nonrestrictive adjective because they couldn't
fathom that an interracial marriage could be a bona fide marriage any more than a fake diamond
could be a bona fide diamond. (We call them racists.)
Moreover, what Stainton claims to have “long been recognized by formal semantics” is actually
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false. There is a positive presumption in favor of speakers not using ‘same-sex’ and ‘gay’ as non-
restricting adjectives, witness the obvious fact that they satisfy the test case for restricting
adjectives:
a gay man is, after all, a man
a same-sex couple is a couple
a lesbian domestic partnership is a domestic partnership.
But what is more, according to semanticist Ed Keenan:
There are a number of non-restricting adjectives, such as alleged and fake. However,
there is a sense in which the prototypical function of a modifying expression is to be
restricting; and, statistically, non-restricting adjectives certainly appear to be a small
minority, limited to a few particular classes of expressions. Therefore, it does not seem
incorrect to regard the set of restricting adjectives as being “almost” the whole set of
adjectives.12
Moreover, as has been amply demonstrated in the linguistic literature, non-restrictive adjectives are
a varied lot, and most of them do not have the implicational pattern of ‘fake’. For example, in the
sentence:
The lucky Parisians live in the most beautiful city in Europe.
the adjective ‘lucky’ is being used non-restrictively. The sentence, in the intended reading, means:
The Parisians, being so lucky, live in the most beautiful city.
and is attributing luck to Parisians generally. It does not mean (does not have to be read as
meaning) what it would mean were the adjective to be used restrictively, namely:
Those among the Parisians who are lucky live in the most beautiful city.
But even in its non-restrictive use, the adjective does not follow the implicational structure of
‘fake’:
a fake diamond is not a diamond
but
the lucky Parisians are, after all, Parisians. 13
So a plastic tree may not be a real tree, but nothing as far as adjectives are concerned stops a gay
marriage from being a real marriage. Stainton is just wrong about this.
Stainton supports his contention that a gay marriage falls short of a real marriage by claiming that:
“our speaking of 'same-sex marriage' involves the use of the adjective at all times in
addition to the noun” [Stainton, para 15]
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This also is false.
Mr. P and Mrs. Q request the pleasure of your company at Mary and Sue's wedding.
Hans and Derk have had a fulfilling marriage since being legally allowed to be married.
are not sentences that lack a word.
Compounding confusions, Stainton claims that:
“'common-law marriages' are not marriages any more than a 'same-sex marriage' would
actually be a marriage” [Stainton, para 18]
The adjective “common-law” is non-restricting in the expression “common-law marriage” only if by
‘marriage’ one means a legally registered marriage. The problem with ‘same-sex marriage’ then
relies not on confusions about the sort of the adjective, but on equivocation about the noun: it is
precisely the case that ‘same-sex’ would act as the restricting adjective that it is, if only gays could
legally register their marriages. The following test makes that clear:
a same-sex marriage is a marriage, just not a legally registered marriage;< but
a same-sex legally registered marriage is, after all, a legally registered marriage.
VI. Wherein is Marriage Social
Is Stainton right (cf. (5)) that extending the reference of ‘marriage’ to include gay and lesbian
unions would change the meaning of ‘marriage’? Does this extension introduce a new word
‘marriage’?
Surely admitting women to law school extended the reference of ‘lawyer’, but just as surely it did
not change the meaning of ‘lawyer’, any more than acknowledging women as persons changed the
meaning of ‘person’.14 Whether ‘marriage’ can extend its reference to same-sex unions depends on
what it means, not on what it has previously referred to. The first albino tiger was a tiger by virtue
of satisfying the conditions of being a tiger, in spite of being the first albino tiger.
Putnam showed that words derive their senses from extrapolation from canonical referents to
whatever bears the same-kind-of-thing relation to those canonical referents. In “Individualism and
the Mental” (1975), “Intellectual Norms” (1986) and “Wherein is Language Social” (1989), Tyler
Burge showed that it is not just any user of the language who can extrapolate from canonical
referents to whatever bears the same-kind-of-thing relation to them. We all agree on canonical
referents of ‘marriage’: our moms and dads, Charles and Diana, Henry VIII and Catherine of
Aragon, Socrates and Xanthippe, Ike and Tina Turner, Edward and Mrs. Simpson… But what
constitutes being-in-the-same-kind-of-relationship-as-that?
Frege was neither first nor last to show that being-the-same-kind-as is a different property than
being-thought-by-ordinary-users-of-a-word-as-being-the-same-kind-as. At least in its use as a
natural kind term, ‘water’ is for no one merely whatever seems to be the same substance as this
potable, transparent, odourless liquid flowing in rivers and lakes. As a natural kind term, ‘water’ is
for everyone whatever is the same (even Locke acknowledges real essences to be substances,
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however unknown to us). What this potable liquid is (barring complications of a pragmatic-realist
sort well-known to readers of Putnam) is determined by those most knowledgeable about the stuff,
and those people (chemists) reveal its nature as H2O. By ‘water’ (at least in its ordinary use as a
natural kind term) we mean anything bearing the same-stuff-as relation to this (H2O), regardless of
its being potable (some water is not), transparent (some water is not), odourless (ditto), or flowing
in rivers and lakes (water would not cease to be water if it never again flowed in rivers and lakes;
and if whiskey henceforth and forever flowed in rivers and lakes, it would not for all that be water).
It is a basic point of epistemic humility that we may not master the condition of individuation of the
same-stuff-as this relation (being H2O). Expert individuation of canonical instances yield senses,
and senses yield references. That’s exactly why meanings ain’t in the head.
One can be a competent user of ‘water’, that is, apply it competently to the right cases, without
knowing that H2O is its condition of individuation. One does not have to be an expert about its
meaning to be a competent user of the term ...as long as the identifying information one has in the
head (potable, …, in rivers and lakes) overlaps in the real world with the individuating conditions
(being H2O). Our competence with the use of words is a matter of luck, really: it depends on how
frequently in the real world the stuff satisfying our stereotype for water really is water, the condition
satisfying our stereotype for arthritis really is arthritis, the stuff satisfying our stereotype for brisket
really is brisket, relative to how frequently in the real world they aren’t. If XYZ started flowing in
rivers and lakes on odd Tuesdays, people would mistakenly call “water” stuff which, by their own
lights, they would not mean to call “water” (stuff which, upon reflection and given the relevant
information, they would judge themselves to have been mistaken in calling “water”). And the more
mistakes they made, the less competent they would be, by their own lights, with the use of their
own words. That’s indeed why few people would consider themselves deeply competent with the
use of the word “beech”: the sheer number of kinds of trees satisfying our stereotype leaves too
little chance for luck to succeed in picking out just the beeches.
As with natural and other kinds, so it is with social kinds. Being-the-same-social-kind-as is a
different property than being-thought-by-ordinary-users-of-a-word-as-being-the-same-social-kind-
as. Being a lawyer is different from being thought to be a lawyer, eating brisket is different from
thinking one is eating brisket. Ordinary speakers are competent with the word “lawyer” because
most of the people whom we think of as lawyers actually are. But none of what an ordinary speaker
need know to use ‘lawyer’ competently determines the individuation conditions for being a lawyer;
those are determined by Bar exams, as these are determined by those most informed about what one
must know to be a lawyer.
Clearly, being married is a different property than being thought-by-ordinary-users-of-the-language
to be married. This alone suggests that being-in-the-same-kind-of-relation-as-these-married-people
is not the same property as being-thought-to-be-in-the-same-kind-of-relation-as-these-married-
people. And the existence of this difference implies that some people understand marriage better
than others. These are the people Burge is talking about: those who understand under what
conditions one currently counts as being married.
What of the property being marriageable? Is there a difference between that and being-thought-by-
ordinary-users-of-the-word-to-be-marriageable? The word “marriage” derives its sense from
extrapolation from canonical referents to whatever bears the same-kind-of-relation to those
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canonical referents. But are there any experts on what constitutes being-in-the-same-kind-of-
relationship-as-that? Who decides what counts as a correct extrapolation when it comes to
marriage?
One answer – let’s call it the Chomskian answer – is that there are as many words “marriage” in
English –as many concepts of marriage in the community– as there are coherent answers to this
question. So there is a catholic concept of marriage – ‘marriageCatholic’ – (which, as we speak, and
among other things, disallows divorce and polygyny), an Islamic concept of marriage –
‘marriageIslamic’ – (which, as we speak, and among other things, countenances divorce and
polygyny), and a Canadian legal concept of marriage – ‘marriagecivil’ – (which, as we speak, and
among other things, countenances divorce but not polygyny). We can also say that beyond these
hyponymous terms, there exists in English the superordinate term ‘marriagegeneral’ (which applies
to anything from catholic marriages to tree marriages – yes, in some cultures people marry trees).
This is not only a reasonable answer, it is one to which Stainton himself is committed. But it is not
the answer to our question. However, it does help us reformulate our question more precisely.
If we ask the question, “What counts as a correct extrapolation when it comes to the Catholic
concept of marriage?,” the answer is clear: the extrapolation countenanced by Catholic Canon Law,
as interpreted by the relevant religious authorities. The same is the case, mutatis mutandis, with
respect to the Islamic concept of marriage. But our question – the question before the Canadian
Courts and Parliament facing a legal ban against same-sex marriage in a secular democracy such as
Canada – is what counts as a correct extrapolation when it comes to the Canadian legal concept of
marriage. Ours is uniquely a question about the meaning of ‘marriagecivil’. (Neither the Courts nor
Parliament have any jurisdiction with respect to the correct extrapolation of ‘marriageCatholic’ or
‘marriageIslamic’, or consequently ‘marriagegeneral’.) So in citing the Canadian Oxford as
authoritative about Canadians’ usage with respect to the word “marriage”, Stainton makes a mistake
analogous to equivocation: as is evident from the dictionary entry (“the legal or religious
union...typically...”), the Oxford is attempting to describe stereotypic cases of ‘marriagegeneral’
rather than of ‘marriagecivil’; but it is only the latter word which is relevant to the court
proceedings.
Thinking one is correctly extrapolating the meaning of ‘marriagecivil’ is not the same as correctly
doing it. But if there is to be this difference, there must be some people in charge of setting the
norms of correct extrapolation for the Canadian legal concept of marriage. I will have substantive
things to say shortly about whom such people might be, but first let me restate for emphasis three
points.
First. I agree with Stainton (as against Kaplan, say) on word individuation: when a word changes its
meaning, it becomes a different word, designating a different concept.
Second. Meanings and words retain their integrity despite extensions (or diminutions) in reference.
Our word “dog” will not undergo a meaning change when poodles, chihuahas and St. Bernards
cease to exist and new species of dogs evolve.
Third. It is entirely possible for even the most competent speakers to come to realize that a word
extends its reference to something previously unrecognized. Such recognition does not alter the
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word’s meaning, even in the mind of its potentially surprised user. The semantics of ‘person’ did
not change one bit when women and blacks became so-called.
VII. Two Dogmas of Preclusionism
Stainton is guilty of two confusions, each inconsistent with the other. The first one is to think that
our current language is coerced by its history, a thought hugely more compatible with Heidegger
than with Chomsky. The second is to think that current speakers of our common language have an
analytical grasp on the meaning of ‘marriage’, that we can intuit facts about marriage by virtue of
our understanding of language alone.
VII.i. Historical Reductionism
Stainton claims before the Court that:
The marriage ceremony is the method for becoming life partners which has a faith-based
history, and must involve a man and a woman. [Stainton, para. 14]
The key distinguishing feature of marriage is its history, including in recent history, its
religious origin. This history is reflected in the highly specific ceremonies by which
couples marry. It is true that one can now undergo a civil ceremony, and that such
ceremonies were historically available, but even current civil ceremonies are clearly a
descendent of older, specifically religious traditions: In civil ceremonies, one still stands
before an appropriate official in a formal and solemn ceremony, recites vows closely
analogous to those of the Judeo-Christian tradition, and signs highly conventionalized
documents. Thus marriage is not merely a legal status even now. In my opinion, an
understanding of the term ‘marriage’ necessarily entails this long and rich history.
[Stainton, para 19]
To look at marriage as divorced from the religious interpretation of the practice and the
historical background of the practice is, in my opinion, to miss the meaning of marriage
altogether: marriage just is a descendent of a highly particular, highly stylized practice
with religious roots. To divorce marriage from its history in this way would be like
trying to divorce being a nun or being an altar boy from their religious roots! Though the
institution has been embraced by the State and marriage has a legal status, this has not
erased its origins. So, when I say that marriage “is” a descendent of its history, this is
essential to understanding precisely what the word 'marriage' actually means. We cannot
divorce our understanding of the term from its history. [Stainton, para.20]
His argument implies the general premise that:
(i.1) institutions and practices are necessarily individuated by their history.
This general premise, instantiated to marriage, relies on an empirical claim:
(i.2) historically, marriage is an essentially religious institution.
Stainton’s third premise links metaphysics to meanings:
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(i.3) meanings are a function of causal origins.
And he concludes:
(i.4) we cannot understand the meaning of the word ‘marriage’ without reference to religion.
There are numerous things that are wrong with this argument.
It is hard to see how anyone can feel justified in believing that the very first marriages were
religious, let alone essentially religious, (and much less Judeo-Christian!)15 How would Stainton
know that pre-religious hominids didn’t marry? Nor is it any easier to see why anyone would take
the history of marriage for Canadians to begin with the Judeo-Christian tradition. Canadians are a
broad-minded lot, capable of conceiving of non- or pre- Judeo-Christian unions as marriages.
It is a platitude that institutions and practices evolve. Most every Canadian school, university and
hospital was founded as a religious institution, yet we are not compelled to think of them as
religious institutions today.16
In any event, Stainton’s argument is inert with respect to the issue at hand. For even if religious
intentions were essential components of the meaning of ‘marriage’, that would not constitute an
argument against same-sex marriage without the corollary that religion has not changed, and could
not change without altering what we mean by ‘religion’. It is not because religion historically
excluded female clergy and married priests that it is essential to religion that it exclude female
clergy and married priests, and no more because religion historically excluded same-sex marriage
that it must do so today. (Pace Stainton, even the Catholic Church historically performed same-sex
marriages, but let that pass.)17 The argument is invalid without the further premise that religion
necessarily excludes homosexuals – in which case the Metropolitan Community Church of Toronto,
which happily marries homosexuals, is not really Judeo-Christian, nor even religious, as we mean
it, at all.
Stainton claims that we are all committed to the religious origins of marriage because there is only
one word ‘marriage’ in our common tongue, “the one synonymous with ‘wedlock’ and
‘matrimony’,” a word allegedly leading back to religious origins. Notice, however, that if the
meaning of the word ‘marriage’ that Stainton is talking about indeed involves religion essentially,
then it follows by his own lights that there are already at least two words ‘marriage’ in common
usage today, one designating a religious concept and another designating a legal concept –our
‘marriagecivil’. For these have different meanings according to Stainton himself, witness the fact
that an essentially religious concept of marriage is both overinclusive and underinclusive with
respect to the legal concept of marriage in contemporary Canada: not all religious marriages are
recognized as valid marriages by Canadian Law (eg. those not legally registered, those involving
minors, polygamous marriages no matter how sanctioned by religion, etc.) and not all legal
marriages are recognized as valid marriages by Canonical Law (post-divorce marriages for
Catholics, marriages with a non-Muslim for Muslims, Dutch same-sex marriages for Dutch Catholic
churches, etc.).
Whatever the meaning of ‘marriage’ may be said to be on the view under discussion, in order to
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have remained unchanged throughout the ages, its original (allegedly only) meaning would have to
have been all along compatible with rather distinct kinds of relationships, ranging from the often
brutal woman bartering contracts not untypical of past (and present), even religious, marriages, to
the loving intimate unions of equals that with any luck form the basis of marriage today. To
maintain as Stainton does that a word with a meaning compatible with the kind of relationship some
of us would communally understand as female enslavement, had not changed its meaning by the
time it canonically extended to consensual, loving relationships between equals, but would change
its meaning if extended to consensual, loving relationships between homosexuals, is nothing if not
bizarre.
If the historical semantic markers of ‘marriage’:
religious, heterosexual, woman bartering, equal, consensual, procreative, dissolvable
   +             +                +                         -             -              +                 -
could shift to:
   +/-             +              -                         +             +/-            +/-               +
without altering the meaning of the word, we are owed an explanation as to why it could not just as
well (indeed much more easily) shift to:
+/-
without altering the meaning of the word. How heterosexuality is supposed to be more individuative
of the relationship of marriage than any other property does not, and cannot, fall out of the historical
argument per se.
VII.ii. Analyticity
Religion aside, how do we know that heterosexuality is essential to the meaning of ‘marriage’?
Here Stainton appeals to the natural light of reason: that marriage requires a male and a female is a
semantic theorem.
Semantic content and language-based necessary truths. Certain necessary truths derive
from meaning within a language. For instance, it is not just a contingent matter of fact
that bachelors are not married. This is, rather, a necessary truth: it is simply not possible
for bachelors to be married. This impossibility depends, in some very complex and
poorly understood way, upon the fact that ‘bachelor’ currently has as a part of its
semantic content “not married”. True enough, if the sound ‘bachelor’ changed its
meaning, it could eventually turn out that the sentence ‘He is a married bachelor’ could
be true of some individual. But given its current meaning, this sentence cannot be true.
This is relevant because, as I will explain below, it is part of the present meaning of the
word ‘marriage’ in our common tongue that it applies only to male-female conjugal
unions. [Stainton, para. 9]
Stainton’s argument to the conclusion that heterosexuality is analytically tied to marriage is that
same-sex marriage is intuited as a semantic anomaly:
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The common parlance term ‘marriage’ (‘wedlock’, ‘matrimony’) can only be sensibly
applied to male/female pairs. Exactly why this is the case is complex. Notice, for
instance, that the marriage ceremony involves a bride (female) and groom (male), each of
whom typically has gender-specific vows. Also, after the ceremony, there is a wife
(female) and a husband (male). English does not allow us to say ‘I now declare you
husband and husband’ any more than it allows us to say ‘My boys are very close sisters.’
These sentences violate semantic rules. [Stainton, para. 14]
Let us review the argument.
(ii.1) It is a semantic rule of English that one cannot say:
I now declare you husband and husband.
Stainton maintains that something semantic prevents us from saying this. He appears to derive from
the claim that English (mildly) frowns upon such constructions, that there is a conceptual problem
with being a couple in which there is a husband and a husband. But there is a simple explanation
that accounts for the mild off-putting feeling about this sentence, an explanation which does not rest
on there being a semantic or conceptual problem with being a husband-husband couple at all: the
simple explanation is that (for reasons ranging from superficial morphosyntactic if not aesthetic
constraints to formal requirements of binding), English shuns any construction of the form “an x
and an x” where x are the same. For example, if Martha is looking for a husband and Mary is
looking for a husband, there is no conceptual or semantic difficulty whatsoever, yet English is
uncomfortable with:
Martha and Mary are respectively looking for a husband and a husband.
English prefers that we pluralize and reduce the conjunction:
Martha and Mary are looking for husbands.
Similarly, English has no problem with:
I now declare you husbands.
Stainton moves smoothly from (ii.1) to the claim that marrying couples have to be pronounced
“husband and wife”(!). Hence,
(ii.2) It is an analytic truth (true by virtue of meaning) that:
A marriage ceremony involves a bride and a groom,
and
After the ceremony, there is a wife and a husband.
Nowhere does Stainton state the semantic rules requiring marriage to issue in a bride and a groom.
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We are expected to rest content with the claim that this is so for “very complex and poorly
understood” reasons [Stainton, para 9] Now, since
(ii.3)It is an analytic truth that:
Brides and wives are female,
and
Grooms and husbands are male.
It then follows that
(ii.4) It is an analytic truth that:
A marriage requires a male and a female.
Hence the common English usage as reflected in the dictionary entry states an analytic truth in
current Canadian English.
Unless (ii.2) can be established, of course, the argument blatantly begs the question. If gays and
lesbians can be married but men can’t be brides nor women grooms, then eo ipso a marriage
ceremony needn’t involve a bride and a groom.
So how do we tell if ‘marriage’ analytically implies heterosexuality according to common usage?
Who are the experts here, and what are they experts about?
Kant considers a statement analytic
(a) only if its truth is independent of fact,
a view echoed in Peirce’s notion of
(b) a statement confirmed no matter what.
For Kripke, an analytic statement would be
(c) one expressing a metaphysical necessity which is knowable a priori.
In “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” Quine considers (in order to reject)
(d) several conditions, either of which would show a statement to be analytic:
(d.i) if substitution of synonym for synonym within the statement yields a logical truth;
(d.ii) if the statement is a meaning postulate, and so analytic by stipulation; 
(d.iii) if no possible experience can disconfirm the statement; 
(d.iv) if its denial is self-contradictory.
More recently, Boghossian has distinguished between
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(e) epistemic and metaphysical elaborations of the phrase “true by virtue of meaning”:18
(e.i) epistemic: a statement is analytic “provided that grasp of its meaning alone suffices
for justified belief in its truth;”
(e.ii) metaphysical: a statement is analytic provided that “it owes its truth value
completely to its meaning, and not at all to ‘the facts’.”
Let us then submit the claim that “marriage is heterosexual” is analytic to this arsenal of tests.
The failure of these types of arguments in supporting the analyticity of “a marriage involves a bride
and a groom” and “a marriage is a union of a man and a woman,” coupled with the sloppiness of
the arguments proposed in its support and the generous evidence against it, should amply suffice to
show that these are no more analytic than is “water is H2O”.
“Water is H2O” is not an analytic truth.
That water is H2O is very much dependent on the fact that it is H2O rather than anything else that
flows in rivers and lakes – cf. (a) above. It owes its truth value to ‘the facts’ – cf. (e.ii). It is not
true no matter what: it would be false if the stuff in rivers and lakes we had been calling ‘water’ had
turned out all along to be XYZ rather than H2O – cf.(b). It is not known a priori but discovered –
cf.(c). It would be disconfirmed by discovering that it was XYZ after all – cf.(d.iii). ‘Water’ is not
synonymous with ‘H2O’: ‘water’ means same liquid as this H2O whereas ‘H2O’ means with
molecular structure composed of two atoms like this (hydrogen) and one like that (oxygen). So
‘water is H2O’ is not reducible to a logical truth by substitution of synonyms – cf.(d.i). That water
is whatever experts count as the same liquid as H2O is not a meaning postulate but rather follows
from a meaning postulate – “‘water’ means this (water)” – along with the above further
considerations – cf.(d.ii). Someone sceptical that water really is H2O may be guilty of empirical
inadequacy but not of self-contradiction (one can consistently believe that ‘water’ means same
liquid as this and yet doubt that this is H2O) – cf.(d.iv). Understanding the sentence “a molecule of
water is composed of two atoms of hydrogen and one of oxygen” does not alone suffice for justified
belief in its truth (else chemistry exams would be a cinch) – cf. (e.i). That my idiolect countenances
the meaning postulate that ‘water’ means same liquid as this, is, I believe, something that I can
intuit. That water is of necessity H2O is not. That water is H2O is necessary, but only if what we
mean by ‘water’ is same liquid as this (water) and only if the same liquid as relation is
individuated in terms of molecular structure. Individuate the relation same liquid as in, say,
descriptivist terms (“counts as the same liquid as this whatever is of like colour, odour, taste,
potability, and source” and what you then call ‘water’ can be H2O or XYZ). Individuate that
relation in sub-atomic-enough terms and the word “water” becomes a proper name for this token of
water. Who decides where we draw the boundaries around the same liquid as relation for water?
You and I decide which word ‘water’ we are each targeting at any moment of utterance (a chemical
kind term, a functional kind term, a phenomenal kind term), but it is chemists who draw the
boundaries around the same liquid as relation for ‘water’ considered as a chemical kind term. It
nowise follows from the fact that I can intuit the meaning postulates of my own idiolect (‘water’
means same liquid as this chemical kind) that I know, much less intuit, the individuation conditions
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of same-liquid-as-this-chemical-kind. Even Locke got this right.
‘A bride is a woman’ is an analytic truth (or some considerations to that effect, perhaps)
I am far from convinced of the analyticity of ‘a bride is female’ and of ‘a groom is male’. But let
me lend Stainton a hand in presenting two arguments for thinking it plausible.
An argument from French:
I do not side with Quine in rejecting all but logical truths as analytic statements. I am happy
accepting that certain statements are analytic (or analytic-like), plausible examples of which might
be:
The word for a bride in French (“la mariée”) is of feminine grammatical gender,
and
The word for a groom in French (“le marié”) is of masculine grammatical gender
which every speaker of French knows to be true by virtue merely of knowing the language, in
particular of knowing the morphological fact that ‘la’ is the feminine definite article and ‘le’ the
masculine and the syntactic fact that nouns in French agree in grammatical gender with their
determiners.19 Native French speakers needn’t know what ‘la mariée’ means, to know that the noun
belongs to one grammatical class rather than the other. This information is provided by the
determiner.
More semantically involved is the fact that feminine animate grammatical forms generally associate
with referents of the female sex while masculine animate grammatical forms generally associate
with referents of the male sex.20 Thus, if presented with: ‘la + [animate noun]’ and asked to choose
a sex for the referent, a French speaker will generally presume a female referent. Mutatis mutandis
with ‘le’. Thus
La + [animate noun] est une femme
and
Le + [animate noun] est un homme.
can be intuited (almost) a priori. Because the definite singular (except in its generic use) forces one
to choose a sex for the referent, it almost falls out of the language that:
La mariée est une femme. – The bride is a woman.
and
Le marié est un homme. – The husband is a man.
are true. These statements are possibly as close as it ever gets to analytical truths.21
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If these count as truths by virtue of meaning (my hesitation comes from the admixture of syntax),
then one could say that since ‘une mariée est une femelle’ in French means ‘a bride is a female’ in
English and ‘un mari est un mâle’ in French means ‘a husband is a male’ in English, then ‘a bride
is a female’ and ‘a husband is a male’ are also (as much) true by virtue of meaning. Granted it may
strike one as bizarre that analytic truths of English should be dependent on a distinction between
French determiners that does not exist in English... But weirder things have surely happened.
An argument from etymology.22 Perhaps less weird is the following argument stemming from
etymological facts about English.
When lexical synonyms are found within a language, it is usually because one of them is a
borrowing from another language, and the loan-word typically receives a specialized application:
thus ‘mutton’ and ‘sheep’ are in some sense synonyms, but ‘mutton’ (a loan-word from French
‘mouton’, meaning sheep) bears the specialized sense of dead-sheep-to-be-eaten; same for ‘pig’ and
‘pork’ (from French ‘porc’, meaning pig). This natural process of lexical specialization has a
practical explanation: since the borrowing language already has a word for that kind of thing, it puts
the loan-word to specialized work. This process explains why true lexical synonyms are so hard to
come by.
Now, our current word ‘bride’ (meaning bride) derives lexically, by an uninterrupted causal chain of
incremental phonetic transformations, from a Proto-Germanic word meaning woman.
‘bride’
Old English: bryd or bráád




It appears in Old English (borrowed from a neighbouring language) at a time when Old English
already possesses a word ‘wif’ meaning woman (later to evolve to mean wife). Lexical
specialization from woman to bride is exactly what we would expect from a word for “woman”:
*bruth Proto-Germanic, appearing in a language which already has one with this meaning: wif Old
English. (later to evolve into ‘wif-mann Middle English’ = woman-person, womanModern English). It is
then no surprise that ‘brydOld English’ should have specialized from woman to bride (or
woman-being-married). Likewise, our current word ‘groom’ (meaning bridegroom) derives from a
word meaning (male) man.
‘bridegroom’ 
Old English: brydguma – bryd + guma 
“suitor” – “bride” “man”
Lexical specialization from man to groom (or man-being-married) is exactly what we would expect
from a word for “man”: guma Old English, appearing in a language which already has one with this
meaning: man Modern English.
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Now it would be a fallacy to maintain that the mere fact that ‘bride’ derives from a word for woman
constitutes an argument that ‘bride’ today implies, much less means, woman. And mutatis mutandis
for ‘bridegroom’. Semantic shifts away from original meanings occur ubiquitously, indeed they are
the norm. Our ‘assassin’ comes from an uninterrupted causal chain of slight transformations
(phonetic, morphological and semantic) from the Arabic ‘hashishim’ meaning hashish eaters; yet
because of the kind of transformations that have occurred, it would be a colossal mistake to infer,
from the analytical truth that Hashishims ate hashish, that assassins eat hashish as a matter of logic!
Nevertheless, the onus may favour left-over implications of femaleness for ‘bride’ and of maleness
for ‘groom’ in these particular cases. Historical reconstructions in linguistics systematically take
their source from common household words expected to occur in all languages independently of
borrowing (typical examples being: ‘mother’, ‘father’, ‘water’, ‘fly’–as in the insect) precisely
because common household words are the least likely to undergo semantic shifts.23 A common
household word like ‘woman’ could be expected to drift into the specialized sense of ‘bride’ far
more than it could be expected to shift away from its core sense of ‘female person’. Similar
considerations apply in support of the implication of ‘male person’ for ‘groom’.
Since lexical derivatives such as ‘*bruthWOMAN – bryd BRIDE’ and ‘gumaMAN – groom GROOM’
(provided there has been no dramatic semantic shifting along the way) stand in the relation of
superordinate (more general) to eponymous (more specialized) concepts, it is no surprise that we
can get from logical truths like:
A woman is a woman
and
A man is a man
by substitution of lexical derivatives (again, provided there has been no dramatic semantic shifting
along the way) to:
A bride (bruth = woman) is a woman
and
A groom (guma = man) is a man.
Since lexical derivatives like: ‘bruth – bryd ’ in the right conditions are in some sense the same
word, they are logically even closer than synonyms (likewise for and ‘guma – groom’). And
substitution of ‘bryd’ for ‘bruth’ would satisfy Quine’s condition (12.d.i) for yielding an analytic
truth.
It is crucial to understand what this argument does, and more crucially does not, say. I emphatically
do not want to be interpreted as claiming anything remotely connected to the view that etymology
determines the meanings of our words and thus compels us today analytically to tie femaleness to
‘bride’, any more than that the religious history of any institution compels us to think of it as a
religious institution today. Mine is not a normative point about individuation by history like that
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expressed in Stainton’s premise (3). It is simply a descriptive point about word-cum-meaning
transmissions, one too cumbersome to spell out fully here, but which can be summarized thusly: as
words pass from one head to another, they keep and lose some of their properties (phonetic,
morphological, syntactic and semantic).24 This is due, according to me, and consistent with
Chomskian (and Dawkinsian) premises, to individualistic aspects of our psychology, but here is not
the place to argue for this.25 Given the kind of stable deictic household terms that ‘woman’ and
‘man’ are, and the way words are generally transmitted over time, these words are, as a matter of
empirical fact, less likely to shift in meaning over time. In Chomskian and Dawkinsian terms, if
you will: the relation between trans-generational idiolects with respect to stable deictic household
terms is likely on empirical grounds to be one of high copying-fidelity. The argument above, that a
prima facie case can be made that the specialization of a word for woman (or for man) into a word
for bride (or for groom) will not have caused them to lose their original semantic implications of
femaleness (or maleness) in the heads of many speakers today, is perfectly consistent with their
having indeed lost their original semantic implications in the heads of many speakers today, or with
their doing so tomorrow. The argument is presented here only to explain as a matter of descriptive
fact why some, perhaps many, English speakers today might analytically be tying femaleness with
bridedom, and maleness with groomdom.
Note that the etymological argument above works (if it does) for English, and must be done on a
case by case basis for other languages. To the extent that not all Canadians are English speakers, let
alone native English speakers, it is far from establishing the sought-after premise that a bride is a
female and a bridegroom is a male in the consciousness of Canadians. Crucially (in view of the
Canadian context), the argument does not work in French, where the same word applies both to the
bride and to the groom, both during the wedding (‘mariés’) and thereafter (‘époux’), morphological
differences between ‘mariée’ (bride) and ‘marié’ (groom), and between ‘époux’ (husband) and
‘épouse’ (wife) being required by the sex of the referents, not the other way around. If “all grooms
are males” is an analytical truth in English, then so should be its correct French translation. Yet
‘tous les mariés sont mâles’ is false.
Be that as it may, note that to say that it is analytic that a bride is female and a groom is male does
not for one second settle the question of under what conditions anything counts as a female or a
male. For instance, some persons of XY chromosomal constitution have been declared female by
Canadian Courts, indeed, even by the Ayatollah Khomeini (and allowed to marry males).
Before closing my remarks on the plausible analyticity of ‘A bride is female’ and ‘A groom is
male’, let me point out the very different role of the expert in establishing these truths as opposed
to the truth that water is H2O. Where establishing the essence of water requires expertise about
some stuff, establishing analytical connections between words, as I expect the preceding makes fully
clear, requires expertise merely about language. What kind of expertise is required to decide
whether or not ‘Marriage requires a man and a woman’ is analytic?
‘A marriage requires a bride and a groom’ is not an analytic truth
Let us begin by seeing how the previous two arguments, which established the analyticity of ‘A
bride is a woman,’ fare with respect to ‘A marriage requires a man and a woman.’
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The argument from French:
That a marriage requires spouses is an analytic truth. To marry (French: ‘épouser’) is (at least) a
two-place relation, the relata being spouses (from the French verb ‘to marry’, formerly espouser).
But the French argument is silent about the required sex of the spouses. And surely English does
not frown upon “I now pronounce you spouses.”
The argument from etymology:
The English word ‘spouse’ derives from a verb meaning “to promise”.
‘spouse’ (via French) Latin: spondre, “to promise”
The noun ‘wedlock’ comes from words meaning throughout “an earnest pledge”, with ‘lock’ being
a folk etymological reanalysis of Old English ‘lak’, meaning “a gift, an activity or proceeding to
seal a deal”.
‘wedlock’ 
Old English: wedd 
Old High German: wetti
Indo-European: wadi
‘lock’
Old English: lak, “a gift, an activity or proceeding to seal a deal”
To ‘betroth’ comes from “faithfulness, truth, a pledge”.
‘betroth’, bi- + Old English: treowððe, “thoroughly” “faithfulness, truth, a pledge”
West Saxon: triewðð
Mercian: treowðð, “faithfulness”, triewe, treowe, “faithful, true”
Etymologies for the word ‘marriage’ are surprisingly hard to track down. It appears to issue from
Latin agricultural language meaning “linked, united” (as a fruit to a vine), and develops later in the
sense of “conjugal” in imperial poetic language. ‘Maritus’ “husband”, and later ‘marital’ “wife”,
appear to be connected to a host of words designating men or women disposed to unite.
‘marriage’
Latin: maritus; marital, maritus
“husband” “wife” “linked, united” (as a fruit to a vine) -lang of agriculture, “conjugal” -
imperial poetic language
Old Lithuanian: marti, “young woman”
Ancient Greek: meirax, “girl, boy”
Ancient Indic Sanskrit: marya, “virile young male lover”, Mari “the female goddess”
Old Persian: marika, “subject”




Latin: matrimonium = mater + -monium, “mother”
Latin: moneta, “money”
The translation of matrimonium is “legal maternity”. This may explain why English typically
speaks of “holy matrimony” rather than “matrimony” tout court, marriage being a way of becoming
a mother that is sanctioned by the Church, which says more about motherhood than about marriage.
Again, to the extent that memetic inheritance via lexical semantics explains our intuitions of
analyticity, we find more notion of faithful promise than any requirement about sex in our lexical
bequeathal of words meaning “marriage”. If expertise on marriage is based on linguistic knowledge,
then that expertise suggests that marriage has to do with commitment, rather than with the sex of
those who commit.
Now, I have so far provided merely a negative argument about the lack of analytical connection
between heterosexuality and marriage. What would count as a positive argument that a marriage
does not analytically imply heterosexuality? Here, apart from the historical record suggesting that
homosexual marriages have actually taken place, we have nothing more to rely on other than
counterfactual intuitions. So let us review our desiderata for analyticity in light of such intuitions.
Is the heterosexuality of marriage independent of fact –cf.(12.a)? It is hard to state that
heterosexuality is an empirical fact about marriage without begging the question at issue, so let us
move on to (12.b): is it confirmed no matter what?
Here, it seems clear that it is not; for if we discovered centuries-old registers of Judeo-Christian
marriages which had been tampered with and where gay and lesbian marriages had been
deliberately struck out after an edict discovered to have been issued by a 16th century pope, we
would surely take this as confirmation that gay and lesbian marriages had occurred. We would not
conclude, as per the requirements of analyticity, that these had never been marriages in the first
place; for such discovery would pull the rug from under the very argument from religious history.
So some possible experience could disconfirm the statement that “Marriage is heterosexual” –
cf.(12.d.iii).26
As shown by the etymological argument, substitution of synonym for synonym within the
statement “Marriage is heterosexual” does not yield a logical truth –cf.(12.d.i); at best it derives the
empirically dubious claim that a promise has something to do with the sex of those making it. Nor
is its denial self-contradictory –cf.(12.d.iv): while I grant it might be hard to understand what a
brother wants who wishes to be declared a sister, it takes bad faith of colossal proportions to
purport not to understand what gays want who wish to be married.
Is the heterosexuality of marriage knowable a priori –cf.(12.c)? To think so would imply that we
know a priori that it excludes homosexuals. And this in turn would presuppose that we know a
priori of the existence of homosexuality, a most bizarre suggestion in light of the thousands of
years of denial of its existence.
The empirical fact that homosexuals have seldom if ever been tolerated as equals gives extra weight
to the analogy with the “persons” case: it seems absurd to us now to think that ‘person’ excluded
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20th century women from its semantic reach as a matter of meaning postulate anymore than
“lawyer” ever excluded women by virtue of its meaning –cf.(12.d.ii). Law schools and law
institutions excluded women as a matter of fact, facts completely analogous in nature to those
which explain the exclusion of gays and lesbians from the institution of marriage. This is fully
evident both in the disingenuousness of the arguments presented by the Crown against the
petitioners’ right to marry,27 as well as in their striking formal similarity to those presented in the
“persons” case.28
VIII. Individualism and the Legal
Most ordinary English speakers in Canada understand the word “citizen”. They do not, at least not
qua ordinary speakers of our common language, understand for all that the correct individuation
conditions for being a citizen of Canada. These are determined by Canadian Law, as constrained by
the Canadian Constitution, as it is interpreted by Canadian Courts. Ordinary speakers know what
these are, if at all, because they know the Law, not because they know the language. Canadian Law
defines ‘Canadian citizen,’ because ‘citizen’ is a legal kind term. The Law can be changed, but the
Law in this stipulative respect cannot be wrong.
The definition of ‘marriage’ under Canadian Law as “a union of a man and a woman to the
exclusion of all others” does not define ‘marriage’ in Canadian English. Thus, both sides agree that
‘marriage’ is a social kind term, not primarily a judicial term of art. For this reason, Marriage Laws
can be mistaken. For the Law is meant to reflect the social kind of relationship a marriage is, not to
constitute it (even though, once in effect, the Law may become constitutive of civil marriage).
But even stipulative Laws do not end there. No law is self-interpreting. Canadian Law stipulates
that a (non-immigrant) citizen is any person born in Canada, or outside Canada of at least one
Canadian parent. But whether an arbitrary X counts as a citizen according to the Law depends on
what counts as a person, what counts as a Canadian parent, what property being born in Canada
amounts to, etc. These are not concepts whose extensions we can wholly predict in advance of all
prompting from reality or from our philosophical imagination. Does being cloned on a Canadian-
owned spaceship in outer space count as being born in Canada, or from Canadian parents? This was
Hobbes's point: that Laws require interpreters, and since interpretation must come to an end, Laws
require Sovereign interpreters. These are our Courts, ultimately our Supreme Court. Their role is to
interpret the Law.
The Court cannot alter or prescribe the meanings of chemical kind terms. Courts cannot tell
chemists what water is, nor order them to change what they mean by their chemical term “water.”
But a role the Courts do play is that of determining which word “water” is being used when. It’s
part of the Court’s job to judge when a reasonable person would be expected to understand that
‘water’ was being used as a chemical kind term and when it was being used, say, in a looser
functional sense.
Suppose a sign by the water fountain in a surgical ward reads: “Do Not Give Water to Pre-
Operative Patients”, and someone hands out XYZ to all, causing great operative havoc. We would
turn to the Courts to determine whether the action was an indictable offence or an innocent
misunderstanding. It would be the judge’s job to determine the genuineness or disingenuousness of
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a defence of “But Your Honour, XYZ isn’t water!” Now suppose a sign on a jar in a chemical lab
reads “Water Only”, and someone spoils the experiment by pouring in XYZ. Again, it would be the
judge’s job to determine the genuineness or disingenuousness of a defence of “But Your Honour,
you said last time that XYZ was water!” The Court may require expert help to articulate how the
specialized chemical and ordinary functional senses differ, but it could not fulfill its function if
judges themselves had no sense of the difference. (Imagine having to assess the damage done by an
insult committed in a language you don’t speak.) That is why ordinary humanity is among the
highest virtues of a judge.
The Court’s two roles, as interpreter and as lexical identifier, come together in the marriage case.
The Court’s purview in the marriage case is not to force a meaning change on the ordinary word
“marriage” but to determine which of the many ordinary words “marriage” in circulation in Canada
today is the one in use in the Law. Religious fundamentalists, supported by premise (3), argue that
what figures in our Marriage Laws can only be their word “marriage” since it is their institution
that antedates the Law; and their word “marriage” analytically precludes homosexuals.29 What the
Court is being asked to do is to say whether that’s the word, or given the constraints imposed by
the rights and freedoms guaranteed in our Constitution, even could be the word, meant by the Law
in Canada today. Others, supported by premise (4), argue that what figures in our Marriage Laws is
the word of the Oxford Canadian. What the Court is being asked to do here is to interpret the
lexical entry in light of the constraints imposed by our Constitution, to wit, which part of the entry,
if any, is or can be a definition of marriage; and which part is or must remain stereotypic
information about heretofore married couples.
And what the Ontario and Québec Courts, and the British Columbia Court of Appeal, have
determined can be put in the following terms: that the word ‘marriage’ that occupies the subject
position in statements of Law has not been (for at least as long as we have empowered our
Constitution to constrain our concepts) and cannot in Law be that (religious) word, for the presence
of that word in Law, or any other word precluding homosexuals, violates constitutional guarantees
of equality for homosexuals. In the words of Justice LaForme:
The submission [that the impediment to the legal recognition of marriage between same-
sex couples lies in the language of the constitution itself] amounts to an attempt to freeze
a meaning that may have been understood by the framers of the constitution back in
1867. Such a proposition is unsupportable in law. 
At the outset, such a proposition contravenes the basic principle of Canadian
constitutional interpretation that “the B.N.A. Act planted in Canada a living tree capable
of growth and expansion within its natural limits.” (Edwards v. Canada 1930 AC 123
(PC)at 136) [Halpern v. Canada (A.G.) 2001, LaForme Reasons for Decision, p.81,
emphasis mine]30
The Court has no mandate to change or to prescribe the ordinary meanings of words. Its mandate is
to individuate them, and to identify which may figure in our Laws. It is the Constitution, in the last
instance, which determines the same-as relation for (civil) marriage. The reason for this is because,
to the extent that we (individually or collectively) make the moral commitment to submit our
concepts about the social to the constraints imposed by our Constitution, we will our concept of
(civil) marriage to be consistent with these. That is part of what makes my concept of marriage the
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one it is, regardless of the accuracy of my representation of it to myself, in exactly the way that
H2O individuates my concept of water, regardless of the accuracy of my conception of it (as a
transparent, odourless, thirst-quenching liquid...), provided that I commit myself to a concept of
water as a natural kind. (That is one reason why holding a referendum on gay marriage is such a
roundly misbegotten idea.) We defer to the Court because, and to the extent that, we acknowledge
the Court as the expert in the consistency of our legal concepts with the moral concepts embodied
in constitutional provisions. We do not have analytic intuitions about this. That is why Justice
McMurtry of the Ontario Appelate Court was so overwhelmingly right to say: “We are not
interested in polls,” something we would indeed be very interested in if the essential properties of
marriage, or the consistency of our concepts with constitutional provisions, were available at our
neuronal tips as analytical intuitions.
The Court does not prescribe which word “marriage” I should be using, but better individuates the
moral (constitutionally constrained) concept which I already use –as long as the concept of marriage
that I intend is the moral, constitutionally constrained, concept, the only concept of marriage
allowed to figure in the Law. The judiciary is not only “the guardian of the constitution,” as Justice
Dickson once said, but the measure of the consistency of our concepts with constitutional
guarantees.
What is analytic about my word “marriage” and necessary about my concept of marriage (or any
word and any concept) depends not at all on its religious or other history, facts only contingently
accessible to my consciousness if at all. It depends on what category of word (or concept) it
happens to be in my mind, on what categorial role it plays in my language (as a natural kind term,
a social kind term, a morally constrained kind term, a proper name, etc.). That, I think, we can have
analytic intuitions about (though we can make mistakes about even what those are). However else
chemists may represent water to themselves, qua chemists, they are compelled to think of ‘water’ as
a natural kind term.
However much marriage may be a religious kind of thing in someone’s mind, in the mind of
anyone at the moment of contemplating whether there should be a legal ban on same-sex marriage,
marriage is a legal kind of thing. The question before the Courts in our constitutional democracy is
not whether same-sex couples are marriageable by Catholic Canon Law, by Sharia Law, or by the
Law of Gravity, but whether they are by the constitutionally constrained Civil Law of a secular
Canada.
Quine mocked the suggestion that analytical intuitions were somehow “primitively compelling.” I
disagree with Quine’s blanket statement. I find the grammatical genders of French words
primitively compelling indeed. Nothing would make me change my mind about a word’s gender (or
its syntactic category) except realizing that I had made a mistake in reporting my own intuitions
about it. Even seeing it presented as other-gendered in a French dictionary would not move me: as a
devout Chomskian, I would proudly assume the status of lone speaker of a language in which that
word had the grammatical gender I ascribe to it.31
Nothing I have said so far prevents anyone from proudly ...or at any rate, from assuming the status
of speaker of a language in which marriage analytically excludes homosexuals. But by which
primitive compunction does any such person intuit a semantic fact such as that?
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IV. Belief de gay
The chemist is not primitively compelled to exclude XYZ from the concept of water, but is
compelled to do so by theory. In this, marriage is entirely like water. Theory, however primitively
compelling it might feel to its owner, is also what would compel one to exclude same-sex couples
from marriage. The Great Ape Project is dedicated to the inclusion of apes into the category of
persons. People who would deny apes such status must do so based on their (implicit or explicit)
views about apes; no conception of personhood can exclude apes all on its own. Likewise, no
conception of marriage excludes same-sex couples all on its own. What we find primitively
compelling about the notion of marriage is inseparable from how we represent to ourselves the
moral status of gay and lesbian relationships.
State-sanctioned-but-not-marriage unions for gays and lesbians as are proposed under the
“registered domestic partnership” scheme demean them just as surely as refusing to call women
“persons” demeaned women. One of the intangible benefits of being married is precisely that of
having one’s union recognized as a marriage, to have that word apply to it. Nor does this proposal
fare any better if all couples henceforth become registered domestic partners. Apart from
scapegoating gays as responsible for the destruction of marriage, it fails full and equal respect for
gay unions, just as surely as would telling women and blacks: “only white men are really persons,
but fear not, we’ll abandon that word and refer to all of us as ‘humans’ from now on.”
The exclusion of gays and lesbians from marriage is, as the Lord Chancellor of the Privy council
wrote in 1928 about the persons case, “a relic of days more barbarous than ours.” And to paraphrase
him further:
To those who would ask why the word “marriage” should include gays and lesbians, the
obvious answer is: why should it not?
One good reason why Stainton must revise his philosophical views on meaning is because they
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Notes
1. For fruitful discussion at various stages of preparation of this article, I am grateful to Tim
Stowell , the members of the Philosophy Department of the University of Rijeka, the participants of
the Philosophy of Science Conference on Rationality in Dubrovnik, and the participants of the Third
Barcelona Workshop on Reference; also to Queen’s University for granting me a sabbatical leave,
to the Government of Spain for generous financial support of my research, and to the University of
Barcelona Logos Research Group for providing a warm and philosophically stimulating
environment. My debt to Tyler Burge will be evident throughout. A special thank you to Gary
Kibbins and Bryce Swerhun for useful comments, to Mark Johnston for a dose of courage, and to
Steve Yablo for inspiring the sub-title.
This article is dedicated to the memory of Daniel Robillard (1956-2002).
2. See Erhlich and Stainton, Expert witness Affidavits in Egale v. Canada (A.G.), filed in the
Supreme Court of British Columbia, in the matter of Applications for Licences by Persons of the
Same Sex who Intend to Marry; and in the matter of The Marriage Act and The Judicial Review
Procedure Act (Vancouver Registry No. L001944; L002698; L003197), August 2001; and in
Halpern v. Canada (A.G.), filed in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Court files 684/00,
30/2001), November 2001. 
Ehrlich argued that calling gay unions for example ‘registered domestic partnerships’
fomented the existing (and harmful) conception of gays as less entitled, and the conception of
their unions as inherently different and less worthy. Ehrlich defended the position that by
extending the reference of the term 'marriage' to gays and lesbians, “courts would be helping
to shape a social reality in which gays and lesbian unions are not stigmatized and
marginalized.” [Erlich, para ]. Pace Stainton, it is difficult to disagree with this statement. By
extending ‘marriage’ to gays and lesbians, courts would be shaping a social reality in which
gays and lesbians are married. This would surely help to destigmatize and demarginalize gay
unions. 
Despite his own acknowledgement that words do influence attitudes, Stainton concludes that
applying the word ‘marriage’ to same-sex marriages “would not sufficiently influence our
perceptions and our social reality as to remove harm [to homosexuals].” [Stainton, para 20]
Stainton does not explain why efforts to reduce homophobia are worthless unless they
eliminate it altogether.
3. See affidavit filed in the same courts. The present article is based on the arguments presented in
these Expert witness Affidavits. I remind my readers that the relevant affidavits here are public,
serious and lengthy documents, sworn under oath to represent their author’s views, and aimed at
influencing the Highest Courts of the land. Not since Morgentaler v. Canada (A.G.) have
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philosophers in Canada participated so directly in decisions of such momentous importance.
4. In 1928, the Supreme Court of Canada, citing original intent, denied that the word “persons” in
Section 24 of the 1867 British North America Act included female persons. In 1867, women did not
vote, run for office or serve as elected officials. Only male nouns and pronouns were used in the
BNA Act, and the British House of Lords had no female member. The five male Justices concluded
that it was not the business of the Courts to change this tradition. Prime Minister W. L. MacKenzie
King referred the petition to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council of England, Canada’s
highest court of appeal at the time. In October, 1929, the Privy Council (rejecting the semantic
argument) affirmed that women were indeed persons and hence eligible to become Members of the
Canadian Senate.
5. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) Because their home state of Virginia outlawed interracial
marriages in 1958, Richard and Mildred Loving married in Washington D.C., and later moved back
to Virginia. In 1959 they were prosecuted and convicted of violating the state's anti-miscegenation
law. They were each sentenced to one year in jail, but promised a suspended sentence if they agreed
to leave the state and not return for 25 years. After moving back to D.C., they sued the state of
Virginia in 1963, challenging the constitutionality of the anti-miscegenation law. In March 1966,
the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals upheld the law, but in June 1967, the U.S. Supreme Court
unanimously ruled the law unconstitutional.
6. This insightful phrase is from Martha McCarthy and Joanna Radbord, lawyers for the petitioners
in Ontario.
7. Stainton is wrong here about the origins of the word “tort”. It is in fact no more a legal creation
than the word “marriage”, but, like it, an adaptation by the law of a common word. It is attested in
the 11th century in Medieval Latin and Old French in the common sense of “a wrong, an injustice”,
and enters common English in the 14th century with this meaning. The word “tort” acquires the
English legal sense of “a breach of duty whereby some person acquires a right of action for
damages” only at the very end of the 16th century. Though obsolete in today’s common English,
‘tort’ in its common usage survived for 160 years after the borrowing of the term by English Law,
and it survives to this day in modern French in its common sense, as well as being the French word
for tort. A French speaker has no trouble understanding the connection between the common and the
legal sense, and uses context for disambiguation.
8. Putnam’s argument must be understood carefully. It only implies that Courts cannot overrule
chemists about natural kinds considered as natural kinds. It does not imply that Courts cannot
overrule chemists about natural kinds considered as legal kinds. For instance, in 1893, the US
Supreme Court ruled that the tomato, though botanically a fruit, is, for legal trade issues, a
vegetable.
9. From Logical Investigations, ed. Geach, Yale UP, p.12. “But knowledge of language is a special
thing when proper names are involved.” [p.11]
10. Since (7) is presented as a semantic theorem, strictly speaking it follows from no premises, and
(4), (5) and (6) can be taken as different ways of making the point in (7). But as (4), (5) and (6) do
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play an epistemic role of substantiating the claim in (7), I present them as premises. Nothing I can
see hangs on this mode of presentation of the argument.
11. “The publication of Webster's Third New International Dictionary in 1961 set off a storm of
controversy both in the popular press and in scholarly journals that was virtually unprecedented in
its scope and intensity. The New York Times ridiculed the new dictionary. [...] The attack was
joined by Life magazine, the Saturday Review, the Atlantic, the New Yorker, and other magazines
and newspaper across the country. Critics charged that Webster's Third had abandoned its
responsibility to uphold standards of good English and that it would encourage permissiveness in
the teaching of English. [...] 
[Webster's Third] has come to be regarded by virtually all language experts as one of the great
dictionaries of our time.” See Herbert Morton, The Story of Webster's Third. Philip Gove's
Controversial Dictionary and Its Critics. Cambridge University Press, 1994.
12. Edward Keenan and Leonard Faltz, 1985: Boolean Semantics for Natural Language,
Reidel/Kluwer, p. 310.
13. Monotonic non-restricting adjectives have been much discussed by Noam Chomsky and Tim
Stowell. My thanks to Stowell for the current example.
14. Though possibly extending the reference of ‘person’ to corporations may have. As John Ralston
Saul says: “If you’re a person before the law and Exxon or Ford is also a person, it is clear that the
concept of democratic legitimacy lying with the individual has been mortally wounded.”
15. Indeed, according to Yale historian John Boswell, the Christian Church got into the business of
marrying only in the 13th century when it declared marriage a sacrament. Before that, the Church
blessed the nuptials only of priests! See Christianity, Social Tolerance and Homosexuality and
Same-Sex Unions in Pre-Modern Europe.
16. Queen's University was originally founded by Royal Charter of Queen Victoria in 1841 “for a
[Presbyterian] ministry trained within the country, and for the education of youth in the principles
of the Christian religion”, but it is a secular institution today, the “last vestige of denominational
control” having been explicitly removed in 1912. See Queen's University, Faculty of Arts and
Sciences Catalog 2001-2002 (Kingston: Queen's University, 2001), 490-93.
If Queen’s University is the same institution today as it was at its founding, that alone shows that
its religiosity is not essential to its individuation. If religion is essential to its individuation, then
Queen’s University became a different institution in 1912. Mutatis mutandis for the institution of
civil marriage in Canada: either it belongs to the same institution of marriage as the religious
institution of marriage causally connected to it (hence religiosity is not individuative of the
institution of marriage), or else religion is essential to the individuation of marriage and hence civil
marriage has always been a different institution than religious marriage. Either way, civil marriage
is not an essentially religious institution.
17. See Boswell, who provides examples of same-sex marriages being performed in the Roman
Catholic Church as late as the 17th and 18th centuries.
18. Boghossian 1997: “Analyticity” in A Companion to the Philosophy of Language (Hale &
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Wright, eds.), Oxford: Blackwell.
19. Every French noun belongs to one of two grammatical classes (annoyingly called “the
masculine gender” and “the feminine gender”, but not to be confused with the male sex and the
female sex). For further discussion, and implications of such distinctions for English, see Mercier
1996, “A Perverse Case of the Contingent A Priori: On the Logic of Emasculating Language (A
Reply to Dawkins and Dummett)”, Philosophical Topics (special ed. S. Haslanger), Arkansas
University Press, and for implications for French, see Mercier 2002, “L'homme et la factrice: Sur la
logique du genre”, Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review, VOL. XLI, No. 3.
20. Importantly, I say generally, for almost all masculine occupation titles and names of animals
and some feminine animate forms can refer to both males and females: ‘la personne’, ‘le docteur’,
‘le professeur’, ‘le cheval’, ‘la vipère’, etc...
21. These statements are only almost analytic truths, since possible experience can disconfirm them
and their denial is not always self-contradictory (see previous note), and since the kind of
analyticity involved is truth by virtue of a strange mixture of meaning and morphosyntax (of the
sort discussed in my 1996 & 2001 cited above).
22. All etymologies herein are from The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language,
4th ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2000; The Compact Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd Edition:
Oxford University Press, 1991; the Oxford English Dictionary Additions Series, Volumes 1-3:
Oxford University Press, 1993 & 1997; the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 5th Edition: Oxford
University Press, 2002; or Webster's Third New International Dictionary, Unabridged: Merriam
Webster, 1993.
23. See J.H. Greenberg, 1974: Language Typology: A Historical and Analytic Overview. Janua
Linguarum, Series Minor, 184 The Hague and Paris: Mouton; and M. Ruhlen, 1994: The Origin of
Language: Tracing the Evolution of the Mother Tongue. Wiley, John & Sons.
24. For details, see my “What is a Word?” (forthcoming).
25. For discussion, see Mercier 1998: “On Communication-Based De Re Thought, Commitments
De Dicto, and Word-Individuation” in Philosophy and Linguistics (ed. R. Stainton), Westview
Press.
26. According to John Boswell (op. cit.), precisely such experiences await us at the Vatican, where
exactly such evidence is securely kept from the public eye.
27. Apart from the semantic argument, the Attorney General of Canada’s case was also based on
procreation as the essence of marriage. When reminded by judges of the fact that some couples who
marry choose not to procreate, the AGC made central the fact of their having the potential to
procreate. When reminded that some couples are infertile, the point was precisified as to their
having the potential for the “rational capacity” [?!] to procreate. When asked: “Can't lesbians
procreate? Can't gays father children?”, the AGC’s reply was that only heterosexual couples had the
potential for the rational capacity to procreate without third party intervention. And when asked
why, on such basis, heterosexual octogenarians should be allowed to marry, the AGC made the
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point that they, but not homosexuals, belong to a group that has the potential for the rational
capacity to procreate without third party intervention. (The Belongs-to-a-Group-that-has-the-
Potential-for-the-Rational-Capacity-to-Procreate-Without-Third-Party-Intervention distinction did
not much impress the judges. The AGC even found herself saying: “I know it sounds lame your
Honours but...”!)
Lame to the point of bizareness is the argument presented in an affidavit by Katherine Young,
professor of religious studies at McGill University, and reiterated on the eave of the Ontario Appeal
in a commentary to the Globe&Mail (May 3 2003), which would leave even Freud speechless. It
goes as follows: Humans have grown used to taking their heterosexuality for granted, and they trust
that their heterosexuality is not vulnerable to cultural change. But humans are not ordinary animals
governed by instincts and drives. What instincts and drives do for animals can only be
accomplished for humans by culture. Heterosexual marriage is culture’s way of fostering
heterosexuality, to guarantee that humans mate and propagate the species. Allowing gay couples to
marry would remove the cultural support necessary for heterosexuality, thus threatening our species.
28. In the “persons” case, a note by the presiding judge, handwritten in the margin of a brief and
intended to close the case (and the subject) stated that women were not qualified for the Senate
because the word “senator” does not apply to a woman, there being no Latin word for a female
senator. On these grounds, he refused to hear the case.
29. Echoing Stainton, Justice Pitfield of the BC case held that the word ‘marriage’ in the 1867
British North America Act unambiguously meant “a monogamous opposite-sex relationship”
(though he does not justify his claim to knowing this), and that the 1982 Constitution Act
currently governing marriage in Canada simply borrowed that word. Hence, amending the
constitutional definition of marriage to allow same-sex marriages would require a formal
constitutional amendment process. Consequently, not even the Parliament of Canada can change the
law and grant homosexuals the right to marry! Ontario Justice LaForme summarizes Pitfield’s
argument (to which he does not subscribe) thus: “The impediment to the legal recognition of
marriage between same-sex couples does not lie in legislation –or in the common law– but rather in
the language of the constitution itself.” (Halpern v. Canada (A.G.), cited in LaForme’s Reasons for
Decision, p.81).
The Ontario Justices unanimously disagreed with Pitfield’s judgment.
30. Every Canadian should be proud of this “basic principle of Canadian constitutional
interpretation” so often derided by the philosophically deaf as “judicial activism”, not only because
Canadian constitutional interpretations are the most cited the world over by legal scholars, but also
because it expresses a deep and correct philosophical understanding of the relation between our
moral concepts (expressed in our Constitution, “The Supreme Law of Canada”), our legal concepts
(expressed in our Laws), and our language (interpreted by the Courts).
31. For phonological reasons having to do with differential pronunciation of determiners, many
French-Canadians are wont to treat as feminine, nouns which Standard French dictionaries treat as
masculine, especially but not only vowel-initial nouns. Some examples include: ‘une orque’ (an
orca), ‘une oreiller molle’ (a soft pillow), ‘ma grosse orteil’ (my big toe), ‘apporte-moi une
sandwich avec une couple de biscuits ’ (bring me a sandwich with a couple of cookies). No amount
of prescriptive admonitions suffice to dissuade such users (myself included) from such practices, so
anchored are they in their idiolects.
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*The wordform ‘hu-we-lijk’ has undergone a meaning change:
‘huwelijk1’ means: Marriage-between-heterosexuals-ONLY.
‘huwelijk2’ means: Marriage-between-hetero-OR-homosexuals.
** After April 2001, Dutch heterosexual couples continue going to City Hall. “I now pronounce
you huwelijked” says the justice of the peace, in Dutch. But (according to Stainton) that is no
longer translatable by ‘married’.
***Alternatively, the Dutch have merely realized in 2001 that their concept of huwelijk1
countenances same-sex unions after all (timelessly, as it were), in which case Stainton is committed
to the view that Dutch-English dictionaries have all along been mistaken to translate ‘huwelijk’ as
marriage.
****Alternatively, marriage (as we understand it) never existed after all in the Netherlands (though
it took until 2001 to realize it), and Dutch couples we think of as married never were.
